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Deductions and Credits for*
State Income Taxes
By WALTER W

HELLERt

State income taxes stand in a class by themselves among the
Federal income tax deductions that cannot quality as expenses
of earning income. Deductibility of such taxes plays a unique
and important role in Federal-State tax relationships in that (a)
it prevents confiscatory combinations of Federal, State, and local
income taxes and (b) it gives the States a helping hand in income
taxation by reducing net burdens and interstate differentials. But
deductibility does only part of the job that needs to be done to
coordinate income taxes and strengthen hard-pressed State tax
systems, and a disproportionate share of its benefits accrues to
the higher incomes and wealthier States.
In this paper, I shall argue (a) that unlike deductions for
other State and local taxes, there is a strong case for retaining
income tax deductibility or some superior substitute in the
Federal income tax structure; (b) that if deductibility is retained,
it needs to be buttressed by a sliding-scale Federal credit; and
(c) that the alternative of removing deductibility and substituting a Federal credit should be given serious consideration.
A. Ti ROLE AND IMPACT OF STATE INCOME TAx DEDucTmirr
Deductions for State and local taxes other than income taxes
have little justification. The already regressive gross burden of
general sales, property, and most selective excises becomes more
regressive under the impact of Federal deductibility In the case
of consumption taxes, the deduction means little (20 percent) or
nothing (where the standard deduction is used) to those in the
* Chairnan, Council of Economic Advisors to the President.
t Onginally published m House Comm. on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess., Tax Revision Compendium: Compendium of Papers on Broadening the Tax
Base, Vol. 1, at 419 (Comm. Print 1959).
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low brackets, and up to 91 percent in the top bracket. In the
case of property taxes, renters get no deduction, and homeowners
benefit inversely to the size of their incomes. Apart from this
perverse pattern of burden distribution, consumption tax deductions are difficult and expensive to verify, and the property tax
deduction (together with deductions for mortgage interest)
distorts resource allocations by drawing funds into home-ownership that would have yielded a higher return in rental housing or
other forms of investment. In short, a determined attack on
income tax erosion should wipe out these deductions. It is true
that the net burden of State-local taxes would thereby be increased, especially for those in higher brackets. But if a Federal
credit were adopted as suggested below, the increase in Federal
revenues resulting from denial of these tax deductions would be
plowed back into tax assistance for the States.
Federal deductibility of State income taxes can be differentiated and defended on several grounds. First, it protects
taxpayers against confiscatory taxation. For example, New York's
top rate of 10 percent, added to the Federal tax rate of 91
percent, equals, not 101 percent, but 92 percent after adjusting
the Federal tax liability via deduction of the State tax. (In
common with one-third of the income tax States, New York
disallows the Federal tax as a deduction, while the other twothirds allow it.) At present rates, either deductibility or a tax
credit is essential to forestall confiscation. If tax reform were to
reduce the top Federal rates to 70 or 60 percent, confiscation
would become only a remote possibility Under these circumstances, the confiscation argument for deductibility would lose
much of its force.
Second, deductibility strengthens State income tax systems
in two important ways: (a) By giving the States access to income
tax revenues at a net cost to taxpayers which, especially for
taxpayers with high incomes, is significantly below the amount
of tax they pay in to the State; (b) by reducing interstate
differentials in net burdens of the income tax, which is most
sensitive to the retarding fears of interstate migration of wealth
and industry
Concrete illustrations of these effects are presented in tables
1 and 2. Table 1, which is based on tax distribution date derived
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1.--Proportion of Minnesota sndividual income tax offset by present deductibility under Federalincome tax and suggested 5-percentFederal credit,by
.ncome groups (as of 1956)1

TABF

Gross income group -

1956
Minnesota
income tax
liability

Estimated State tax
offset by deduclihility
under Federal tax

Amount
0 to $999 ---------------------------$70,023
$1,000 to $1,999 ---------------------431,711
$2,000
to $2,999 ---------------------1,765,961
$3,000 to $3,999 --------------------3.737.591
$4,000 to $4,999 --------------------6,282.605
S5,000 to $5,999 --------------------6,652,750
$6,000 to $6,.99..-------------------5,-68,179
$7,000
to $7,999 ---------------------4,293,034
$8,000 to $8,99 --------------.----2,756.715
$9,000 to$9,999 -------------------2,195,702
510,000 to $10,999 ....---------------1,826,816
$11,000
to $11,999 -----------------1,509.363
$12,000 to $12,999...---------------1,372,416
$13,000 to $13,999 -------------------1,200,485
$14,000 to $14,999 ------.----.-------1,120,292
$15,000 to $19,990 -------------------4,482,08,5
$20,000 to $29,999-------.----------5,882.355
$30,000 to $39,999-------------- 3, 300 892$40,000 to $49,999---------------1,885,834
0,00 to $99,999......--------------- 3,331,592
$100,000 and over.------------- 2,029,646
Total .....................
61,996,047

$14,004
86, 342
353,292
806,431
1,326,119
1,419,872
1, 275,
619
918,987
639,236
522,624
444.502
363,801
384,191
345,267
324,398
1,490,098
2,289.563
1,649,533
1,084,250
2,218,080
1,806,384
19,762,593

Percent

Estimated State tax that
would be offset by a
5-percent Federal tax
credit'
Amount

20.0
$44,100
20.0
477,650
20.0
1,S35,150
21.6
2, .571.350
21.1
3,512,550
21.3
3,094,100
21.7
2,%39.250
21.4
"1,
461,400
23.2
835,800
29.8
609,620
24.3
484,100
24.1
382,010
28.0
341,670
28.8
291,52D
29.0
263,755
33.2
1,045,
665
38.9
1,381,295
50.0
875,815
57.5
W55495
66.6
1,162,690
89.0
51,205,790
31.9

24,476,775

Percent
63.0
110.6
86.9
68.8
55.9
l6. 5
39.9
34.0
30.3
27.8
26.5
25.7
24.9
24.3
23.5
23.3
23.5
26.5
29.5
349
559.4
39.5

1 This table compares (a) the estimated proportion of the Minnesota mdividual income tax that is, in effect, absorbed by the reduction m Federal income
tax liabilities resulting from deduction of the State income tax from Federal
taxable income with (b) the proportion that would be absorbed by allowing
a credit of 5 percent of the Federal income tax liability for State income taxes
paid. Source: data derived from Minnesota individual income tax returns for
1956 by Research and Planning Division, Minnesota Department of Taxation.
2 This is essentially the same income concept as "adjusted gross income"
under the Federal income tax.
3 Computation: (a) The average Federal taxable incomes for the returns
in each gross income group were estimated. (b) The gross Federal income tax
for the returns was computed assuming no deductibility for the State income tax.
(c) The top Federal rates applicable to the returns in each gross income group
were applied to the State income taxes paid in each of these groups. The
dollar values so determined represent the reduction in Federal income tax
liability resulting from the deductibility of State income taxes paid. Computations
were made separately for the single and the married taxpayers and the results
combined to ' Five the estimated total amount of offset. No adjustment was made
for "wastage of State income tax deductions by Federal taxpayers using the
standard deduction.
4 Computed by applying a 5-percent credit to Federal tax deducted on
Minnesota individual income tax returns. Total Federal tax deducted on State
returns was $489,535,000, while the Internal Revenue Service, "Statistics of
Income, 1956, Individual Income Tax Returns" (p. 60), reported $526,262,000
Federal income tax for Minnesota. The pnncipal reasons for the difference in
these two figures are (a) the Internal Revenue data are liabilities incurred while
Minnesota data are deductions for taxes paid, and (b) some Federal tax liability
is.incurred by those not subject to Minnesota State income tax.
5 These figures overstate the amount of State tax offset under present law
because, as illustrated in col. 9 of table 2, the 5-percent credit exceeds 100
percent of the Minnesota tax in the top brackets.
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from Minnesota income tax returns, indicates that nearly onethird of the burden of Minnesota s income tax in 1956 was

absorbed by reductions in Federal liability Even if we allow for
"wastage," by use of the standard deduction, of perhaps half
of the State income taxes paid by those with incomes below
$12,000 (and therefore subtract a little over $4 million from the
nearly $20 million of tax offset), the absorption still approximates

one-fourth of the State tax.
Table 2, column 5, shows the net cost of the State tax after
taking account of Federal deductibility Table 2 in the Appendix
shows that nominal tax rates run from 2 to 10 percent in New
York, and 1 to 10.5 percent (plus a 10-percent surtax) in Min-

nesota. Yet the peak net cost of the State tax after deductibility,
in terms of effective rates, is below 3.5 percent in Minnesota and
T ,I

2.-Vet cost of State-.ncome taxes to tampayers,at selected tnoome leveLs,

and percent of State tam offset by Federaldeductibility and 5 percent Federal

tax credit (Minnesota and.New York, married taxpayer with. 2 dependents,
income year 1959)

Federal

Net Income6
before taxes

tax if no
State tax
levied

State
ta x

(1)"

(2)

Corbined
Federaland

Net cost of State
tax to taxpayer

.State
8

lax.

Amount
(coL 3
minus
col. 1)

-3)

(4)

State fax offset
by deductibility
under Federal
income tax

State tax that
would be offset
by a 5 percent
Federal tax cred

As a percent of Amount Percent Amount Percent
net
(col. 2 of State (5 percent of State
Income
minus
tax
of coL 1) tax
before
Col. 4)
tax
(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

9

Minnesota:
$2,000 -----------$4,000 ------$0
-0
$40
.00
$10
0.0
$16
2.0
$6,000 ....
720
148
838
118
1.97
30
20.3
36
24.3
$10,000 ------ I,592
392
1,898
306
-3.06
86
21.9
79
20.2
$30,000------ 8,348
1,82
9,389 1,041
3.47
785
43.0
417
22.8
$100,000----- 51,912
5,224
53,375
1,463
1.46
3,761
72.0
%596
49.7
° -00,000$
402,456
11
735
403,512
1,056
.21
10,670
91.0
20,123
171.5
N]ew York:'
$2,000= --.-.-.-.--------.-.------.-.--------.-.-.-.-.-----.------.---.------.---.----.---.-----,-----$4,.-.
320 -------320 --------.---------- -----------------16 -.--$6.000...-..
720
34
747
27
.45
7
20.6
36
105.9
$10,0001--, 592
200
1,748
156
1.56
44
22.0
79
39.5
$30.000.....
8,348
1,965
9,468
1,120
3.73
845
43.0
417
21.2
$I00,000....
51,912 8,965
54,422
2,510
2.51
6,455
72.0
2,596
34.5
$500,000.402,456 40,005 406,888
4,410
.88
44,595
91.0
20, 123
41.1

6 Net income after all deductions except for income taxes.
7 Amount actually payable to the State.
8 After taleng account of deductibility of State income tax in

taxable
income for Federal tax.
9

computing

Federal income tax deductible in computing taxable income for State tax.
10 Federal income tax not deductible.

KEN-ucKY LAw jouRNAL

[Vol. 51,

8.8 percent in New York (both at the $30,000 income level)
At $500,000, the net cost drops to 0.9 percent in New York under
the impact of single deductibility and 0.2 percent in Minnesota
under double deductibility
This overall cushioning effect of deductibility is its greatest
strength. But its distribution is perhaps its greatest weakness.
For the higher the income, the deeper the cushion. The higher a
person s income or the wealthier the State, the greater the
proportion of any given State income tax burden that is offset by
savings in Federal tax liabilities. Deductibility relentlessly bends
the upper-bracket end of the State income tax curve into regressive form. As between States, it runs counter to the goal we
customarily seek of reducing interstate inequalities of income.
From tables I and 2 it can be seen that substituting a flat
Federal credit for the existing deduction for State income taxes
would markedly alter the distribution of benefits. Substantial
relief would still be provided in the top brackets. Table 2,
column 9, indicates that a Federal credit of 5 percent would
offset about one-half of the burden of the Minnesota tax and
one-third of the New York tax at the $100,000 level. At the same
time, taxpayers in the lower brackets, who now get an offset
ranging from zero (if they take the standard deduction) to 20
percent, would be relieved of all or a large part of the burden of
the existing State tax (thus making room for additional State
levies in these areas) This improved distribution of benefits is a
secondary, but not unimportant, part of the case for a Federal
tax credit which is examined below A strong inference is that
if a credit is coupled with, instead of substituted for, deductibility, it should be put on a sliding scale, or negatively graduated,
basis.
B. Ti CASE FOR A FEDAL CREnrr
The case for a Federal credit for State income taxes paid does
not rest on the removal of income tax deductibility Retention
or removal will affect the form which the credit should take, but
not the underlying case for it. That case rests on (1) the need
for drawing on the superior taxing power of the Federal Government to undergird the strenuous State tax efforts required to meet
the severe financial strains on State and local budgets today and
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the years ahead; (2) the need to reduce interstate differentials
income taxation and thereby to allay the fears of interstate
migration of industry and wealth which plague the States in their
efforts to make full use of their tax potential; (8) the need for
Federal fiscal support in a form that will reduce rather than
increase income inequalities among the States.
in
in

1. The fiscal strains on State-local budgets
State-local spending and debt have multiplied fourfold in the
postwar penod, while Federal spending has risen 2; times, and
Federal debt, 10 percent. Projections for the next decade
generally foresee rising surpluses for the Federal Government,
rising deficits for State-local governments." The relatively much
greater strain on State-local budgets becomes more understandable primarily in terms of the pressures generated by rising prosperity and rapid population growth, complicated by inflation and
longstanding deficiencies in public plant and equipment.
At the Federal level, we tend to think of economic growth as
generating revenues faster than increased expenditure demands.
But for State-local governments our growing affluence is proving
to be a mixed blessing. Automatic revenue growth is substantial,
but much more sluggish than in the progressive, income-tax
oriented Federal tax system. Meanwhile, the collective wants
associated with increasing economic well-being tend to fall
largely within the traditional sphere of State-local functions and
responsibility- improved schooling and higher education; better
care for the mentally ill and the aged; expansion of recreational
facilities; redevelopment of decaying urban areas and unsnarling
of local transit and traffic problems; improved sanitation facilities,
water sources, and pollution control. In the interplay of economic
forces and political processes, economic growth seems to generate
more expenditure demands than tax revenue for State and local
governments.
At the same time vigorous population growth multiplies
State-local fiscal problems. For the 20-year period from 1946 to
1965, U.S. population is increasing by 40 percent. School-age
i1 See, e.g., the projections by Otto Eckstein in Committee for Economic
Development, Trends in Public E.penditures in the Next Decade 6-10 (April
1959); and Netzer, infra note 24.
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population (ages 5 to 17) is rising by 78 percent; the 65-and-over
group is rising by 63 percent; but the 18-65 group is rising by
only 21 percent. In other words, the most "expensive age groups
for State and local governments are growing three times as fast
as the middle group from which the great bulk of State-local
tax moneys is drawn. (In absolute terms, of course, the growth
in the middle groups outpaces that in the other two groups.)
The population is not only growing fast, but moving fast. The
flight to the suburbs generates irresistible demands for new roads,
new schools, new sewer systems, new firehouses, new waterworks, new parks, and the like. Superimposed on the public
works deficiencies of depression and war that have not yet been
overcome, these new demands will increase State and local public
construction outlays sharply for years to come. Projections by
municipal bond consultants foresee a doubling of 1957"s $11
billion by 1967
Inflation has worsened the relative position of State and local
governments. Not only do their revenue systems respond much
less actively to inflation than the Federal tax system, but price
movements have been adverse to State-local purchases of goods
and services. From 1947 to 1957 the Department of Commerce
deflator for gross national product was 130; for Federal purchases,
135; for construction materials and labor, 143; and for State-local
purchases, 154.
The Federal income tax credit would be an effective way of
helping to redress the balance between Federal and State-local
financial developments. For example, a 5-percent credit would
make roughly $2 billion annually available to State-local government without cost to State income-tax payers. Not all of this
would be a net addition to State revenues, but as will be shown
below, an increase in the average size of the credit, or the use
of a sliding scale concentrating the benefits of the credit in the
lower income groups, would provide sizable additional revenues
even to States whose average income tax liabilities exceed the
average Federal credit. (A comparison of the figures for Minnesota in table 1, above, and table 3, below, illustrates the latter
point.)
In short, as the Federal Government, barrng a worsening of
international tensions, develops leeway for tax reduction either
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through economic growth, or base-restoring income tax reform,
it should give full consideration to the States as a claimant on
the available funds. Apart from debt retirement, as necessary, to
reduce inflationary pressures and facilitate inflation control, the
pressing claims of the States for funds to finance their vital
programs deserve at least equal priority with the clanns of taxpayers for Federal tax reduction to facilitate private spending or
the claims of Federal agencies for budget increases to expand
Federal programs. (Evidence that the States are trying to do
their share of the necessary financing job. rather than standing
idly by, is contained m the appendix to tis paper. Table 2 in
the Appendix in particular, demonstrates the efforts in the income
tax field.)
2. The fear of interstate competition
Another important cause of favorable action on a Federal tax
credit is the impact that fears of driving out industry and wealth
have in choking off the full use of State tax resources. Although
every unbiased study of location factors ranks taxes well below
such considerations as skill and productivity of the labor force,
closeness to markets, availability of plentiful water and low-cost
power, the fear of interstate competition continues to be a major,
even a growing, influence in the politics of State taxation. And
the State income tax movement bears the full brunt of taxpayer
threats to seek haven in friendlier tax territory This process of
playing off one State against another has the net effect of weakening the financial base of responsible self-government and striking
hard at the tax which responds most readily to economic growth.
As recessions and the potential revenue instability of State income taxes get smaller and as the economic growth trend gets
stronger, the responsiveness of State individual income taxes to
growth (for every 1 percent rise in the Nation's total output,
State revenues from personal income taxes have been rising 1.7
percent, as against only 1 percent for the sales taxes) steadily

increases the attractiveness of this revenue source as a means of
matching the expanding responsibilities thrust on State-local
government.
Congress should follow the precedent it established 35 years
ago when it enacted a Federal estate tax credit to bring to an end
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the vicious competitive rate cutting which had threatened to run
State death taxes into the ground. A Federal income tax credit
averaging 5 or 10 percent would not remove the interstate competition threat entirely, but it would put a substantial noncompetitive floor under State income taxes and reduce the struggle
for competitive advantage which has retarded the use of the
outstanding growth tax in the State revenue system.
3. Interstate equalization
Either substitution of a Federal credit for deductibility,
whether as a flat percentage of the Federal tax or on a slidingscale basis, or supplementation of deductibility by a sliding-scale
credit would serve to reduce somewhat the existing interstate
inequalities of income. As already noted, the protective impact
of deductibility is greater, the wealtner the State; the higher the
brackets a State s taxpayers are in, on the average, the larger the
percentage of the State income tax burden than can be "exported"
to the Federal Government.
If deductibility is retained, and a flat Federal credit were
added, the present imbalance would not be corrected. Thus,
adding a flat 10-percent credit without removing deductibility
would give taxpayers in the lowest bracket who use the standard
deduction an offset worth only 2 percentage points (10 percent
of the first-bracket rate of 20 percent-), while those in the 90percent bracket who are subject to a top State rate of 10 percent
would get an offset worth 18 percentage points (10 percent of 90
percent plus 90 percent of 10 percent)
As tables 1 and 2 have already demonstrated, substitution of
a flat credit would materially improve the distribution of benefits
by income groups in the sense of sharing a larger portion of the
benefits with the lower bracket taxpayers than they receive at
present under deductibility Since use of the standard deduction
is not taken into account in those tables, the increase in their
relative position is considerably understated. A corresponding
improvement in the interstate impact of the allowance for State
income taxes would also take place with the substitution of the
credit for the deduction. Proportionately, the residents of the
poorer States would get a substantially larger part of any given
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benefit in the form of a tax credit than they now get in the form
of a deduction from income. The net effect would be a shift in
Federal support from the wealthier to the poorer States.

This shift could be magnified by the adoption of a slidingscale credit of the type illustrated in table 3. Here, the credit
would be 20 percent of first $200 of Federal income tax, 10
percent of the next $300, and I percent of the remainder. If
Federal deductibility were retained, it would be imperative to
put a Federal credit in this negatively graduated form in order to
balance somewhat the bias of deductibility in favor of high
incomes. Even if the deduction were eliminated, the desire to
build a positive interstate equalizing effect into the credit for
State income taxes might well lead to some form of the sliding
scale.

Table 3 demonstrates the equalizing effect. The central
column shows that State taxpayers in Mississippi and Montana
would get almost twice as large an average credit against their
Federal tax as those in Delaware, and about one-third more than
those in New York, Michigan, and Illinois. Since the average
credit allowed in each State depends on both the average size
and the distribution of income, the suggested sliding-scale credit
would not accomplish the perfect inverse correlation between
size of credit and per capita income that might be desired. But
its general effect would be the desired one: to provide more
fiscal support to the poorer, and less fiscal support to the
wealthier, States.
C.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

Two main objections, apart from the loss of Federal revenue,

are voiced against the Federal credit .proposal: First, that relatively little support is provided for States whose income taxes
already yield a higher percentage of Federal collections than the
average proposed credit; second, that a large measure of Federal
coercion is involved.
As to the Federal revenue loss, this would depend on the size
of the credit and the action taken on other State and local tax
deductions. Removal of all such deductions would make possible
a Federal credit averaging 5 percent without any appreciable
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TABrL 3.-Allowable creditaganstFederaltndividualincome tao for State income
taxes under a sliding-scale credit plan: 20 percent against the first $200 of Federal tax, 10 percent against the next $300, and I percent against tao in exwc
of $500, selected States, 1956 '
[Dollar amounts in thousands]

States

1956 Federal
individual
tax
Incorne

Total Federal tax
crbdit allowable to Actal State Individual
Income tax colleoresidents of each
Ions, fscal 195
State under sliding
scale credit plan

llability3Amount"

$13,228
$133,344
Arkansas ------------------------------269,593
3,373.902
California -------------------------8,600
161,748
Delaware ------------------------------51,198
644,329
Florida----------------------.............36,781
385,097
Oeorria ---------------------..----......
203,751
......-----------2,611,643
-inois
---------.-.---29,435
303.2.56
Kansas -------------------- ---------32,513
3-------88,475
...--------Louisiana ------57.981
646,807
Maryland -------- ------------------143.024.
1,83,256
ilchizan -------------------------60,349
526,262
Minnesota -----------------.----------12,010
119,728
MissssopL ..------------.----------65,349
746,046
MissourL ----------.-.-........-------9,790
97.412
Montana--.-.....-------------------327,914
4,232,431
-------------.............
New York-181,794
2,149,144
.-----------Ohio -------------------207.911
2,373.040
Pennsylvania ---------15,313
166,319
Rhode Island.
35,355
37 89
---'Tennessee--------214,278
1404530
Texas ----------- -.-------63,210
, 30
Wlisconsin ..-------------------------

As vercent
of Federal
liability

Amount-

As ncmt
of Federal5
llabIlItyi

4.1
$5,413
9.9
4.3
143,339
0
14,471
5.3
7.9 .....................
8.9
25,985
0.6
7.8 ......................
4.4
13.268
9.7
8.0
(Wi)
8.4
7.9
355
9.0
7.8 ....................
M2
64,445
9.6
A0
5,98
10.0
&0
V.)
8.8
7.7
7, &%
10.1
11.3
478,312
7.7
_
8.5 --.8. 8
9.2 -----------.......
1.2
4,422
9.4
&.1
16.1
"110.258
9.2

12 The amounts and percentages shown in cols. 2 and 3 are the credits

that would have been available to the taxpayers in the listed States if these
States had had individual income taxes in effect sufficient to absorb the full
Federal credit. Col. 5 shows the actual State individual income tax collections
in the fiscal year 1957 as a percentage of col. 1. The difference between cols. 3
and 5 does not necessarily measure the full benefit of the Federal credit; States
with average liabilities already exceeding the Federal credit may have areas in
their income tax scale where liabilities fall substantially below the level of
credits allowable under the 20-10-1 percent sliding scale. (See table 1 for an
illustration of this in terms of Minnesota, where the overall ratio of State collections is over 9.6 percent of the Federal but liabilities fall substantially below
the 20-percent ratio in the lower brackets.)
13 Liabilities for residents of the selected States, as shown in Internal
Revenue Service, Statistics of Income, 1956, Individual Income Tax Returns,
table 16, 59-62 (1957).
14 Computed by allocating Federal tax payments to applicable brackets on
basis of table 16, op. cit. supra note 13.
15 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Compendium of State Government Finances
in 1957, table 5, p. 11 (1958).
16 These percentages overstate, on the average, the relative weight of State
income taxes because the Federal liabilities shown in col. 1 are based on unaudited
returns. Audit ad ustments probably add relatively more to Federal liabilities in
the high-income than the low-income States. Also, Federal liabilities are shown
according to the States in which the returns are filed, while some of the income
may be taxable in other States; thls factor would tend to work in a compensating
direction, i.e., overstating somewhat the Federal liabilities in high-mcome States
and vice
17 versa.
Figurcs for corporate and individual income taxes not reported separately.
Percentage shown is an approximation based on combined collections.
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revenue loss. 8 A credit averaging 10 percent would cost, gross,
$4 billion annually or, net of removal of State-local tax deductions, $2 billion.
Turning to the revenue support argument, one must acknowledge that the greatest revenue benefit would go to the 17 States
that do not now have income taxes, and many of these are
economically strong States. At the same time, both significant
direct support and indirect support would go to the 33 States
that already have individual income taxes.:9 Obviously, those
whose income taxes fall short, in the aggregate, of the average
level of the credit would benefit at least to the extent of the
shortfall. But even those whose taxes exceed the level of the
credit, on the average, would in most cases receive significant
revenue support m selected areas of their income tax scale. Minnesota is a good case in point. Table 1 indicates that even with a
5-percent flat credit, the total State tax liabilities in some of the
lower brackets would be nearly equaled, or even exceeded. A 10or 20-percent credit in those brackets would clearly give Minnesota access to large additional revenues without additional
burdens on its taxpayers, even though the overall ratio of Minnesota collections to Federal liabilities would exceed the allowable average credit. Beyond this, of course, the general lightenmg of State taxpayers' burdens via the tax credit would make it
substantially easier to increase State income tax rates.
Finally, what of the coercion issue? The crediting device
represents a paradoxical combination of freedom and coercion.
Its most fundamental purpose is to protect the power of the
purse underlying State sovereignty and local independence.
Moreover, Federal credits, while certain to bring about greater
uniformity not only in income tax burdens but also in the structure
of income taxation at the State level, leave ample room for
variations in State definitions of income, exemptions, and tax
rates. At the same time, the credit would strongly induce if not
force 17 States, with over one-third of the Nation's population, to
adopt at least minmum, credit-absorbing personal income taxes.
Is See Pechinan, What Would a Comprehenszve Income Tax YielLP House
Comm. on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., Tax Revision Compendium:
Compendium of apers on Broadening the Tax Base, Vol. 1, at 251 (Comm. Print
1959).19 See Table 1 in the Appendix.
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On balance, it seems fair to conclude that the Federal tax credit,
particularly if substituted for the present deduction for State
income taxes, offers the States a large gain in fiscal integrity and
independence in exchange for a relatively small loss in freedom
of tax action.
APPENDIX
THE PRESENT STATUS OF STATE INCOME TAXATION
A. PRESENT USE OF THE STATE INCOME TAX
As shown in appendix table 1, 31 of the 50 States now have
full-fledged individual income taxes, while 2 (New Hampshire
and Tennessee) tax only income from interest and dividends.
All of the States having individual income taxes, except New
AYmiwxx TAar~z 1.-States wit ftioome taxes as of ruy l, 1959"
Individ-

Corpo.

ual

~

,Albma.
......
XU_-L'':l

Arkn......

X
x

Mls.l~ippL
M~ol.

X

X
X
X
X

Montana .....
..
New Hampshire
.
New3&sey
---- New Mexico _ New York .......
North CarolIna._....
.
North DakotaOklahom
.
..

Hawaii..---------------X
Idaho ------------------.
1
Iowa---------------Kansas x
Kentucky--------------X
Louis a.:::::::
------x
Minneso a-

--------

11l

X
lx

.X
California
..............
X
Colorado ..................
X
Connecticut --.-........----Delaware---------------.
X
District of Columbia --------X
eorga .
X

Mtaryland ---------Massachusetts.--------

Individ- Corpo.

rate

X
X

IX
X
X
X

X

I

.1
X
x
X
X

I

-X

PennSylvania....

Rhode Island .....
South carn.._..
Tennes
.
Utah -------Vermont._
v.
a

.i.conin.

"x

xX

I

X

(a)
"

X
X

I
X
X
X
X

.

X
X
X

X

Oregon --------

............

.

X

.

rate

I

X..

x

X
.

X

20

Source: Appendix Table 2 and Joint Economic Committee, The Federal
Revenue System: Facts and Problems, 1959, 254-59 (1959). These sources
provide information on rates and exemptions.
21 New Hampshire and Tennessee have very limited income taxes, applying
only to income from interest and dividends.

Hampshire, also have corporation income taxes. In addition,
Connecticut, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Pennsylvania, utilize
corporation income taxes.
B. Bl~c~

Acrivrry IN STATE INcoME TAXATION

Mounting budgetary pressures have generated bnsk activity

on the State income tax front in recent years. New Jersey entered
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the field in 1958 with a corporate income tax. Delaware rounded
out its income tax structure by enacting a corporate income tax
in 1957 Statehood for Alaska (which enacted corporate and
individual income taxes, effective in 1949) and Hawaii (which
completely revised its tax on individual incomes in 1957) added
to the number of income tax States. Several non-income-tax
States seriously considered this source of revenue in 1959, and
Michigan's budget proposals included taxes on both corporate
and personal income, but no new State income taxes were
enacted.
Caught between steadily rising expenditures and the adverse
revenue impact of the recession, many States raised rates and
broadened the base of their income taxes in 1958-59. As appendix
table 2 shows, by mid-1959, 17 States had enacted major income

tax increases and/or adopted withholding and pay-as-you-go
systems. For example, Colorado increased individual income tax
liabilities by 40 to 50 percent and virtually doubled its corporate
tax (by withdrawing Federal deductibility) Minnesota raised
its individual income tax by roughly 12 percent and its corporate
tax by 25 percent; Oregon, already the top income tax State, by
9 percent. Other States enacting sharp increases in individual
income taxes included California, Idaho (whose new rate structure ranks near the top of the income tax States), Maryland,
Montana, and South Carolina. Corporate tax increases were also
enacted in California, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, and Rhode
Island. Six States adopted withholding, bringing the total number to 18.
"Fiscal measures adopted thus far during this year's (1959)
legislative sessions promise to enlarge the tax take of the State
governments by something like $1.5 to $2 billion during the year
now underway This amount roughly measures the net effect of
a host of changes in tax rates-and redefinitions of the bases to
which the rates apply-and adoptions of some new taxes."2 2 This
was estimated to be a 12- to 13-percent increase for State taxes
as a whole. The increases in income taxes, by comparison, were

estimated to amount to 15 percent overall, consisting of a 19percent increase in State individual income taxes (from $1.6
22 State Legislatures Boost Taxes, Business Conditions, Monthly Review of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 4 (Sept. 1959).
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billion to $1.9 billion) and a 10-percent increase in State corporation income taxes (from $1 billion to $1.1 billion) '
The renewed interest in income taxation has been spurred,
first, by its responsive revenue performance in a growth economy

Studies by Dick Netzer on the revenue elasticity of State-local
taxes indicate that for every 1 percent growth in gross national
product, the yield of State individual income taxes as a group
automatically grows by 1.7 percent. Growth of State corporate
income taxes is less, but above 1 percent. In contrast, the "GNP
elasticity" of general sales taxes is only I percent.24

Second, the success of a few income tax States in building the
individual income tax into a truly impressive revenue producer
has also acted as a stimulant. Individual income tax collections
average about 8 percent of Federal collections in the income tax
States. Yet Oregon collects nearly 29 percent; Vermont, 22 percent; Wisconsin and Kentucky, 17 percent; and eight other States,
above 10 percent.25
23id. at 6.
24 Dick Netzer, Financial Needs and Resources Over the Next Decade: State
and Local Governments, a paper prepared for the Conference on Public Finances
of the National Bureau of Economic Research, April 1959 (to be published m a
conference volume by the National Bureau).
25L. L. Ecker-Racz & I. M. Labovitz, Practical Solutions to FinanceProblems
Created by the Multilevel PoliticalStructure, a paper prepared for the Conference
on Public Finances of the National Bureau of Economic Research, April 1959 (to
be published in a conference volume by the National Bureau). The authors point
out that for some individuals the liability for State taxes does not arise in the same
State in wich their Federal taxes are paid. Since only minor deviations are
involved, the percentage of State to Federal collections is, by and large, an
excellent basis for comparing the relative weight of individual income taxes. But
it is not a reliable basis for comparing the relative weight of corporate income
taxes because of large discrepancies between place of payment of the Federal tax
and the place of liability for State tax.
FOOTNOTES FOR APPENDIX TABLE 226 Except for Alaska and Hawaii, where the "change" consists of statehood,
this table represents the results of State legislative action between Jan. 1, 1958,
and July 1, 1959.
Sources for Table 2: Vaned sources, including news reports, interviews, and
Commerce Clearing House State Tax Review.
27These actions bring to 18 the total number of States with income tax
withholding.
28
Ala
introduced its income taxes in 1949 at rates of 10 percent of
Federal
29 liabilities for both corporations and mdividuas.
Former California rates: 1 percent on 1st $5 000; 2 percent on 2d; 3
percent on 3d; 4 percent on 4th; 5 percent on 5th, and 6 percent on income over

$25,000.

8o Provisions shown were enacted in 1957, when Hawaii completely revised
its income taxes. Hawaii introduced its income taxes in 1901.
3i
Plus $5 dependency credit.
82
1Repealed $5 dependency credit.
3SDollar credits unchanged but income equivalents reduced, via rate increases, to $883 for single person and $1,700 for married couple.
(Continued on next page)
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Third, one may attribute part of the relatively strong emphasis
on income taxation in recent State tax programs to the demon-

strated improvements in income tax administration, especially

with the aid of withholding and Federal cooperation.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
3
4 Plus $10 tax credit.
35
36 Plus $25 tax credit.

Forced to referendum by petition prior to October 1959, effective date.

37 Old rates 3 percent on 1st $500; 4 percent on 2d $500; 5 percent on 3d

$500; 6 percent on 4th $500; 7 percent on next $2,000; 9 percent on next $2,000;
9.5 percent on income over $8,000. Combined changes effect an increase of
roughly 9 percent in individual income tax liabilities.

